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The analogy argument for the proper basicality of belief in God 
MARK MCLEOD 
Westmont College, 955 La Paz Road, Santa Barbara, CA 93108 
Alvin Plantinga and others 1 argue that belief in God can be rational for a 
person even though that person has no argument or evidence for that belief. 
Such beliefs are "properly basic." Properly basic beliefs abound, but be-
liefs about God have been systematically refused admittance into this class. 
There are several reasons for this but it is not my intention to discuss those 
here. Instead my focus will be on an argument attributed to Plantinga by 
Richard Grigg.2 He argues that Plantinga is unsuccessful in showing that 
belief in God is plausibly taken as properly basic. Grigg distinguishes be-
tween two aspects of Plantinga's argument, one negative and one positive. 
The negative aspect Grigg characterizes as the "convincing case for the 
claim that foundationalism is unsound" (Grigg 125). Of the positive aspect 
Grigg writes: 
But to say that the foundationalist challenge to the properly basic charac-
ter of belief in God can be rejected is not yet to say that we know that 
belief in God is in fact properly basic. Here is where the second, positive 
component of Plantinga's argument comes in, and that second component 
is built upon an appeal to the obvious basicality of beliefs such as (1) 
["I see a tree"] , (2) ["I had breakfast this morning"] , and (3) ["That 
person is angry"). Now the theist may wish to claim that belief in God is 
as obviously basic, at least for the theist himself or herself, as are (1 ), (2), 
or (3). But it seems evident that in so far as Plantinga's own argument is 
concerned, (1), (2), and (3) have a special role to play. It would not be a 
matter of reasoned argument at all if Plantinga were simply to assert out 
of the blue that belief in God can be properly basic (Grigg 125). 
It is the positive aspect with which I am presently concerned. 
Although Grigg takes Plantinga to be presenting a positive argument for 
the claim that belief in God is plausibly taken as properly basic, this claim is 
not without challenge. Evidence is available that Plantinga is merely showing 
how the burden of proof is on the critic to indicate why belief in God cannot 
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be properly basic. But whether Grigg is correct or not, the kind of argument 
he attributes to Plantinga can be fruitfully explored. 
Before stating the argument, let us be clear about Plantinga's notion of a 
"properly basic belief'. A basic belier is one "I accept but don't accept on 
the basis of any other beliefs (Plantinga ROTNT 54). Such beliefs are not 
held due to propositional evidence I have. A properly basic belief is a basic 
belief which is warranted. It is not, of course, warranted by some other belief, 
but such beliefs are grounded in certain conditions (Cf. Plantinga RBG 78-
82). 
In summary the argument Grigg attributes to Plantinga is this. Beliefs such 
as (1) "I see a tree," (2) "I had breakfast this morning," and (3) "that person 
is angry" are warranted by certain conditions and thus properly basic. Like-
wise, beliefs about God are supposed to be warranted by certain conditions. 
If the two sets of warranting conditions and beliefs are sufficiently similar, 
then one can infer claims about one from claims about the other. Of course, 
the assumption is that Plantinga believes they are sufficiently similar to justi-
fy the claim that belief in God is properly basic. Grigg examines the analogy 
between (1), (2), and (3) and beliefin God and finds it wanting. He attempts 
to show three disanalogies between the paradigm beliefs and their warranting 
and belief in God and its warranting, each of which I examine. Of course, 
if the so-called disanalogies fail to be disanalogies or fail to be relevant dis-
analogies, then Grigg's criticism fails. Barring other relevant disanalogies, 
Plantinga gains an argument, one which, if never intended as an argument, 
he perhaps didn't know he had. I will argue that the first two disanalogies 
fail quite generally, but that the third fails only if Plantinga's understanding 
of proper basicality is correct. I suggest that his understanding of properly 
basic beliefs is not a particularly useful notion, and more generally that 
foundationalism might well be abandoned. This should not, however, be 
interpreted to mean that beliefs about God cannot be justified in ways 
similar to the justification provided for many other commonly accepted be-
liefs. 
I 
Grigg writes that 
the movement from a certain experience y to a belief about God is not 
immune from bias. That is, there is obvious psychological benefit, at least 
for some people, in believing in God; many persons want to believe in 
God. But it can hardly be said that we ordinarily have this kind of bias in 
favor of the belief that we see a tree, that we had breakfast this morning, 
or that another person is angry (Grigg 126). 
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Let us say that a belief-forming practice is any means by which a person S 
comes to hold a proposition as true. This will include, for example, the for-
mation of a belief by one's memory, through one's perceptual apparatuses, 
as a result of reasoning, etc. The exact nature of these practises is complex 
and need not' be discussed here. We do form beliefs, however, and this de-
scription of how they are formed is intended merely as a convenient way to 
refer to that formation. 
Now perhaps it is true that we do not ordinarily have a bias in favour of 
beliefs (1), (2), or (3). Nonetheless, we do have biases toward certain beliefs 
formed by our belief-producing mechanisms. If, as a new employee, I am 
trying to show my boss that I should remain in her employment, a desire 
to that effect may bias beliefs produced in certain circumstances. When 
asked by my boss whether I mailed a letter to Jones three weeks ago, I may 
seem to remember mailing it. The memory may, in fact, be quite strong and 
clear. Further, I may not be aware that I am trying to create a good impres-
sion. Nevertheless, in cases like this my desires may influence my belief-
forming practises. Assuming that I am either unaware of my desire to please, 
or at least unaware that my desire is directly influencing my memory, the 
belief "I mailed the letter to Jones three weeks ago" seems properly basic, 
at least on Plantinga's grounds. Even if I want the belief that I mailed the 
letter to be true, the belief may yet be properly basic. I submit that a great 
many of our beliefs and belief-forming mechanisms are so influenced. We are 
biased in favour of certain beliefs over others. 
The problem with Grigg's claim is best shown by considering beliefs like 
(3). It does seem prima facie true that "that person is angry" or "that person 
is in pain" are not beliefs one would desire to have, nor that would be of any 
psychological benefit to the believer. But to which beliefs are these being 
compared? Does Grigg think that one might have a desire to believe that 
God is angry? Surely having the Deity angry would be the last thing some-
one should desire. It seems more likely that Grigg has in mind the picture of 
God as the loving, caring father or God as the forgiver of one's sin. These 
could be beliefs one desires to have, but then so might the belief "that 
person loves me" or "that person forgives me' be desirable or psychologically 
helpful. Such a bias is not unlike the kind Grigg claims infects religious be-
lief. 
Is there a parallel bias toward perceptual beliefs? Perhaps one could argue 
that the desires are less obvious for perceptual beliefs, since nearly everyone's 
are met. A blind person, nevertheless, desires to see. Maybe the desire to be 
in contact with the world in this way is parallel to the desire to be in contact 
with God. If we had no contact with physical objects, perhaps we would dis-
cover that without them, or at least without the belief that they exist, one's 
life is much poorer. 
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The main point is, however, that the bias Grigg refers to does exist for 
some of the paradigm beliefs. The alleged disanalogy fails. 
II 
The second disanalogy deals with the confirmation of the reliability of the 
belief-forming practises. Grigg writes: 
Plantinga points out that a belief such as the one that I had breakfast this 
morning is properly basic in certain circumstances, i.e., as long as I have 
no reason for supposing that my memory is defective. But note that we 
can trust beliefs such as (1), (2), and (3) not only because we are unaware 
of defects in our experiential equipment but also because we constantly 
have outside sources for confirmation of such beliefs. Indeed, is it not 
only through such outside sources that we can become aware of a defect 
in our equipment? For example, when I return home this evening, I will 
see some dirty dishes sitting in my sink, one less egg in my refrigera-
tor than was there yesterday, etc. This is not to say that (2) is believed 
because of evidence. Rather, it is a basic belief grounded immediately in 
my memory. But one of the reasons that I can take such memory beliefs 
as properly basic is that my memory is almost always subsequently con-
firmed by empirical evidence. But this cannot be said for a belief about 
God, e.g., the belief that God created the world (Grigg 125, 126). 
We can take Grigg to be claiming that the (general) reliability of the 
belief-forming practise is significant for the proper basicality of beliefs in 
that it is this reliability which provides the grounding for the beliefs formed. 
In other words, since most of the beliefs formed by my memory are true and 
I have no reason to doubt that my memory functions well on this occasion, 
this particular memory belief is properly basic. Further, we can understand 
the claim that "my memory is almost always subsequently confirmed by 
empirical evidence" to mean that whenever I either confirm or disconfirm 
my memory beliefs, I usually confirm my belief. Thus, since I generally con-
firm my beliefs whenever I attempt to confirm or disconfirm them, we can 
safely infer that the belief-forming mechanism is (generally) reliable. The 
question then arises, how are my beliefs confirmed? 
Grigg suggests that there is an outside source of confirmation. He may 
mean, although this is an unlikely interpretation, that the confirmation is 
merely "outside" the particular belief being confirmed. If so, then the con-
firmation is straightforwardly circular. If he means, that is, that any other 
(relevant) belief can confirm memory belief p, then there seems to be no 
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reason why another memory belief can't confirm p. But then the reliability 
of the memory itself is shown by relying on the memory. Thus, the confir-
mation of the reliability of the memory is circular. 
On the other hand, if he means that the confirmation of memory belief p 
is to be accomplished using only beliefs generated by some other belief-
forming mechanism, i.e., not by some other memory belief (and here one 
might limit the discussion simply to empirical beliefs, as Grigg's examples 
clearly suggest), then the confirmation is also circular. The memory belief 
that I ate breakfast this morning is confirmed, according to Grigg, by the 
empirical evidence that there are dirty dishes in the sink, that there is one 
less egg in the refrigerator than was there yesterday, etc. These beliefs are 
formed, we might suggest, by the perceptual belief-forming practice, as op-
posed, say, to the memory belief-forming practise. It is easy to see, however, 
that in order to know that these beliefs provide evidence for my having eaten 
breakfast this morning, one must rely on memory itself; one must remember 
that one cleaned up the dishes in the sink from two days ago, that yesterday 
there were 8 eggs in the refrigerator, etc. Perhaps the circle of confirmation 
is somewhat larger in this case, but nevertheless, the confirmation relies upon 
the very mechanism to be shown reliable. 
A similar story can be told of perceptual beliefs and the practise(s) which 
form(s) them. That I see a tree is subsequently confirmed or disconfirmed, 
if it is confirmed or disconfirmed, by deliverances of my perceptual appara-
tuses. I approach the tree more closely, I smell it, or feel it. I make sure that 
it is a tree that I am seeing and not a cleverly created fake tree from a theat-
rical set. This I may do by getting closer and using my sight; I need not even 
use one of my other senses. Although on some occasions I use outside sources 
of information to help confirm the beliefs formed by a given practise, I ul-
timately rely on the mechanism's reliability itself to confirm the results. 
It appears that the confirmation used for both perception and memory is 
circular. 
I have yet to discuss the practises which form beliefs about other persons. 
Let us call these the "person-belief' practises. (There may or may not be a 
separate practise here, but to make the discussion simpler, it is convenient to 
speak as if the practise is separate.) Are there outside sources of confirmation 
for beliefs of this type? Once again, if the confirmation for a particular 
person-belief need only be outside the belief in question (but not outside the 
mechanism), than confirmation is possible in short order. If "that person is 
angry" is to be confirmed, one might predict that further aggravation will 
lead to greater anger. Of course, one forms beliefs about the greater anger 
through the person-belief practise. The circularity of the confirmation is 
apparent. 
Considering the second possibility, if confirmation must be through an 
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outside belief-forming practise then certain other beliefs should be true in 
order to allow one to make the confirmation. But it is not easy to say just 
what else will be true if "that person is angry" is true. Perhaps his or her 
face will be red, or he or she will act in a certain way. But surely these are 
just the characteristics which allowed one's person-belief practice to form 
the belief in the first place. Other predictable actions or reactions will no 
doubt confirm the belief in question, but it seems that if the belief is to be 
confirmed some reliance on the practise in question will be made. Suppose it 
is predicted that the room will be left in shambles. Discovering later that 
the room was, in fact, left in shambles would seem to confirm the original 
belief. And we would form a belief about the state of the room not through 
the person-belief practise but through some other practise. Thus independent 
confirmation seems available. Note, however, that for this to confirm "that 
person is angry," one must also believe that that person left the room in 
shambles. This is a belief formed by the person-belief practise. The confirma-
tion here is again circular. (Of course if there is no separate person-belief-
forming practise, then a parallel argument can be created claiming that 
however beliefs about persons are formed, that to confirm a person-belief 
another person -belief is necessary.) 
At this point it may be suggested that the mere fact of the room being 
left in shambles is some confirmation of the belief that the person was 
angry, without the further belief that the person in question left it that 
way. Similarly with the other examples discussed. Any reliance on the prac-
tises to be confirmed is not a necessary reliance, and in fact the confirma-
tion stands independently of the background beliefs formed or relied on. 
If this is true the analogy argument is not lost, for all one needs for the argu-
ment's success is a good analogy between the paradigm beliefs and belief in 
God. What is true of the paradigm beliefs is true of the religious belief. If 
the paradigm beliefs are confirmed by some belief not formed by the same 
practise, then religious beliefs can be so confirmed, as I will argue. 
What of the practises which form beliefs about God? In at least some of 
Plantinga's examples, and as is confirmed by another of Grigg's suggestions 
(cf. Grigg 126), the kind of experiences which give rise to belief in God are 
not abnormal or special "religious" experiences. Upon seeing the flower, one 
is inclined to believe that God created the flower. In this case it seems that it 
is the perceptual practise which forms the belief about God. If it is, then 
given our assumption about the reliability of perception, there is no reason 
not to take this belief about God as properly basic. 
If this is unsatisfactory, i.e., if one finds difficulty with beliefs about 
God being formed by the perceptual belief-forming practise, then it is pos-
sible to suggest that some other religious-belief practise, a divine sense, if you 
will, forms religious beliefs. Granting that this divine sense exists, the natural 
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question is whether it is confirmed as a reliable belief-forming mechanism. 
It can be argued that such a practise is confirmed in a manner not unlike that 
already discussed. 
According to Grigg's view, if "I had breakfast this morning" is confirmed, 
one finds certain other beliefs to be true. What would one find to be true 
when a belief about God is confirmed? What kinds of belief would be true? 
Would they be empirical? It depends, of course, on the particular belief and, 
perhaps, on the nature of God. Does God intervene in our personal histories? 
Does he reply to petitionary prayer? If so, does he give us all for which we 
ask? On the assumption that he does all these things, one might expect cer-
tain of the confirming beliefs to be empirical. 
Suppose I pray and request to be made wealthy. I might form the belief 
"God is going to provide me with $1,000,000 today." If this were formed by 
the religious-belief practise (and not merely by wishful thinking) then one can 
expect, barring special circumstances, that by midnight I will be able to af-
ford a new Jaguar. If this kind of belief is formed by the divine sense and is 
confirmed, we would have empirically tested it by looking to see if we have 
a large enough bundle of cash or a large enough bank account, etc. at mid-
night. 
But like the memory belief "I ate breakfast this morning," where the con-
firmation provided relies on the belief-forming mechanism itself, the belief 
"God will provide me with $1 ,000 ,000 today" relies for its confirmation on 
the religious-belief mechanism. While one would not need to form a belief 
about God to know that one had enough money to purchase a Jaguar, one 
would certainly have to form a belief about God to know that the money for 
the Jaguar was provided by God. The religious component of the belief is 
significantly tied to the confirmation of the original belief about God. 
It is here that one might raise the question about confirmation not needing 
to involve a further belief about the person behind the act. Possibly confir-
mation lies simply in the fact that I have enough money to purchase a Jaguar. 
Like the case where finding the room in shambles (without also forming the 
belief that the person wrecked the room) is enough to confirm that the per-
son was angry, having enough money in the bank to purchase a Jaguar (with-
out forming another belief about God) is enough to confirm the original 
belief. No disanalogy exists at this point. 
This type of religious belief, nevertheless, seems not to be a likely candi-
date for formation. Many, if not most, theists would disallow beliefs like 
"God will provide me with $1,000,000 today." They are not, the theist 
would say, the typical kind of belief God allows us to legitimately form. 
Perhaps, following Grigg, a better example is the belief that God created 
the world. If this belief were confirmed, what other beliefs would be true? 
Grigg says that empirical evidence cannot confirm it. This is, of course, true. 
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But to expect empirical confirmation is to expect too much. Other beliefs 
about God, however, must be true if "God created the world" is true. If God 
created the world (that is, sustains the world), then surely God also created 
this flower or that tree. Beliefs like "God created the red poppies" or "God 
created this eucalyptus tree" would be true and could confirm the belief in 
question. But how would one know that these beliefs were true? Wouldn't 
one have to rely on the reliability of the very belief-forming practise at stake? 
The answer appears to be affirmative. But isn't this confirmation circular? One 
again, yes, but no more circular than the confirmation provided for the other 
belief-forming practises. 
There are two final points about this aspect of Grigg's argument. First, 
although when discussing the paradigm beliefs he focuses on the reliability 
of the practises, he shifts ground when discussing religious beliefs. In dealing 
with the latter he seems interested in the particular belief "God created the 
world" rather than the belief-forming practise. Confirming a belief is not 
the same as confirming the practise which forms the belief. In regard to this 
a second point arises. Even if one cannot confirm a particular religious be-
lief, e.g., that God created the world, similarly not all memory beliefs or per-
ceptual beliefs can be confirmed individually. That beliefs cannot be con-
firmed individually does not exclude them from being properly basic. The 
second disanalogy fails. 
III 
The final disanalogy Grigg points to promises to be the most significant in 
terms of showing the alleged argument to be faulty. He writes that 
there.is a significant kind of universality which accrues to (1 ), (2), and (3) 
but not to beliefs about God. I do not mean to refer to the supposed fact 
that theistic belief is based upon experiences which not everyone has, 
while beliefs such as (1), (2), and (3) are based upon nearly universal expe-
riences. This would not count against the basicality of theistic belief. 
Rather, I wish to point out that while nearly everyone who has experience 
x is led to the belief that he or she is seeing a tree, experience y leads some 
to a particular belief about God but leads many others in different direc-
tions. In other words, it seems to me that it is not necessarily the case 
that the theist has experiences others do not. It may well be the case, 
instead, that the kind of experience which gives rise to a belief about God, 
unlike the experiences grounding (1), (2), or (3), does not automatically 
give rise to one particular belief. For example, many persons have had the 
experience of being awed by the beauty of the universe without being led 
to believe in a wise creator (Grigg 126). 
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Grigg denies that there is anything esoteric about the experiences which 
form beliefs about God. The experiences are common. They are, nevertheless, 
to be distinguished from other common experiences which lead to the para-
digm beliefs. While experiences such as "being appeared to treely" lead every-
one to "I see a tree", experiences such as "being awed by the beauty of the 
universe" do not lead everyone to beliefs about God. Grigg suggests that if 
two people with normal experiential equipment both have experience x, 
both will form the same belief, while experience y will lead the same two 
people in different directions. 
One immediate response to this suggestion is that it is by no means ob-
viously true that "nearly everyone who has experience x is led to the belief 
that he or she is seeing a tree." One and the same experience might lead to 
many different beliefs. For example, the experience of "being appeared to 
treely" may lead people to have such diverse beliefs as "I see a tree," "the 
tree must make your back yard shady," or "I must cut down that tree." 
It may even lead to beliefs somewhat more removed. For example, upon 
having the tree-like experience one might be led to believe "trees are beauti-
ful" or "how my grandfather loves to work in the bush." The particular 
belief someone is led to depend upon more than simply the phenomenologi-
cal content of the experience itself. 
This response, however, may miss Grigg's point. Perhaps it is best put this 
way. No one having experience x will deny that she or he sees a tree. Expe-
rience y, on the other hand, will not have similar results. Not everyone who 
has that experience is led automatically to a belief about God. Some will 
deny that they have any beliefs at all about God. We might say that in the 
one case the experiences gu,arantee the formation of a particular belief, 
while the other experiences do not have such a guarantee. What I mean to 
say is that experiences such as "being appeared to treely ," along with my 
having no reason to question my belief-forming practise, will automatically 
lead at minimum to the belief that I see a tree. Anyone having that expe-
rience will at least agree that they see a tree. Let these minimal beliefs be 
called "first-level" beliefs. First-level beliefs are guaranteed by the expe-
rience. 
Nonetheless, Grigg's suggestion seems to me incomplete for it is quite 
plausible that other beliefs can be (and are) formed in that very same expe-
rience and that whatever other belief a person forms beyond the first-level 
belief may be quite different from beliefs formed by other people. While I 
form the belief that I should cut the tree down, you may form the belief 
that it provides good shade for our summer barbeques. These second-level 
beliefs, as they may be called, are not guaranteed to be formed by the ex-
perience itself, and on this point Grigg seems to be correct. Although they 
are generated by the same experience as the first-level beliefs, other condi-
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tions may be present which lead to radically different kinds of belief. "I 
should cut the tree down" may be formed as I consider the high winds we 
had last night. "The tree provides great shade" may be formed while fondly 
remembering the successful barbeque we had last summer. But regardless of 
these second-level beliefs, a first-level belief is going to be formed by expe-
riences such as x, or, more cautiously, at least no one will deny the truth of 
the belief when questioned. 
But on this understanding of Grigg's claims, there will be no first-level 
belief which follows, more or less automatically, from experience y. While 
experience y leads some theists to beliefs about God and others (theists and 
non-theists alike) elsewhere, does it follow that there is no first-level belief 
for experience y? It seems that if the experiences are shared by theist and 
non-theist alike then very likely there are first-level beliefs which correspond 
to the experience. Grigg says that many have had the experience of being 
awed by the beauty of the universe but yet not been led to the belief that 
God created it. This is undoubtedly true. But the further inference that 
since everyone will be led in quite different directions in terms of second-
level beliefs that there is no first-level belief doesn't follow. Is there a first-
level belief arising out of the experience? If we try hard enough, wouldn't 
we all describe the experience in (roughly) the same way? In the case being 
considered, isn't the first-level belief just that I am experiencing awe at the 
universe? 
The answers to these questions are, I think, affirmative. There is a first-
level belief for any experience3 and thus the distinction Grigg wants to 
make between the kind of experience which leads to first-level beliefs and 
the kind which leads elsewhere is not a significant distinction, at least if he 
wants to make the distinction solely on the level of the experience. In fact, 
one of Plantinga's own examples shows that beliefs about God (second-level 
beliefs) can be generated out of experiences which Grigg claims generate 
first-level beliefs.4 Plantinga says that when we behold the starry heavens 
above we may form the belief that God created this vast and intricate uni-
verse. No mention is made of an experience of awe. One has this simple per-
ceptual experience and this second-level belief is formed. From this fact it 
does not follow that there is no first-level belief, which in this case would 
be "I see the starry heavens." 
Even if the experiences which (supposedly) lead to beliefs about God are 
not different from other kinds of experience, we have discovered something 
of a disanalogy between the paradigm beliefs and beliefs about God; the 
former are what I've been calling first-level beliefs, the latter are second-level 
beliefs. The paradigm beliefs are beliefs which every believer with normal 
noetic equipment will form, or at least not deny, simply when they find 
themselves having a certain experience (along with, perhaps, the further 
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condition that they have no reason to distrust their belief-forming practises). 
On the account given here, these first-level beliefs are guaranteed to be 
formed, they are formed automatically. This grants the paradigm beliefs 
a certain kind of universality which belief in God doesn't have. Belief in 
God, unlike the paradigm belief, is more like the complex beliefs (e.g., 
this tree provides great shade for our summer barbeques) which are formed 
only when one has an experience along with a set of beliefs which form a 
complex web of background conditions. 
There are three questions to be raised here. First, could one successfully 
argue that from any experience a group of believers might have, if the other 
relevant background conditions are right (that is, kept constant for the 
group of believers being questioned), then all members of the group of be-
lievers will form the same second-level belief? In other words, if one in-
cludes in the set of belief-generating conditions all the relevant background, 
would everyone in those exact conditions form the same belief? Is it pos-
sible for there to be gu,aranteed second-level beliefs, beliefs which will show 
up in, or at least not be denied by, anyone in those conditions? The second 
question is whether second-level beliefs can be properly basic. The third is 
whether some non-religious and commonly accepted second-level beliefs 
might be formed into a set of paradigm beliefs and then used as a basis for 
another analogy argument for the proper basicality of belief in God. 
Grigg may attempt to answer the first of these questions by claiming 
that second-level beliefs are simply not available to us in the same manner 
in which first-level beliefs are. He might suggest that if one tries hard enough, 
or is prompted in the correct way, or is given the correct kind of informa-
tion then, given the right experience, one will always be led to believe the 
correct thing so long as one does not move beyond the first-level, e.g., if 
one is experiencing a tree-like object and there is no reason not to trust 
your belief-forming practise, then one will form the belief "I see a tree". 
But second-level beliefs are so varied and often inconsistent with one an-
other that no hope can be held for a similar result. No amount of correct 
coaching will lead everyone to the same second-level beliefs. 
But why should Plantinga accept this suggestion? Does everyone have 
exactly the same experience? If so, then given that everyone shares the same 
background beliefs, is considering the same issues, and is being prompted in 
the correct way, why would someone be led to one belief and others to 
another? Upon considering the flower one is inclined to believe that God 
created the flower. In this experience the phenomenological content must 
be assumed to be the same as it is when one forms the belief, "I see a flower." 
If it is not, then Grigg could claim that the theist is covertly suggesting that 
the experience is not one in which all may share but rather a special expe-
rience, a religious experience. But Plantinga is not suggesting that some of us 
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are privileged and experience not only the flower but also "God-createdness" 
in the flower. It seems, according to Plantinga's example, that given the visual 
experience of seeing a flower, one is automatically inclined to believe that 
God created the flower. How can this be? In these conditions (experiencing 
the flower) everyone will form the belief "I see a flower" but not every-
one will form the belief "God created the flower". How is it that some are 
inclined to form this belief, while others are not? It is a result of, I am sug-
gesting, the background beliefs one holds, beliefs which, if constant for all 
believers having that experience, would lead to the same belief, viz., that 
God created the flower. Given this view, why can't Plantinga simply claim 
that, given the right kind of prompting, the correct information, the proper 
background beliefs, etc., everyone will form the same belief if they have the 
same experience? 
It is important, of course, that the conditions for all believers are exactly 
the same. Just as one will not get the same first-level belief from two dif-
ferent experiences, one will not get the same second-level belief from two 
different sets of background beliefs and conditions. It is also important that 
all the believers have the same noetic equipment at their disposal. Just as one 
would not expect a blind person to form the same belief as a sighted person 
when the only information available is visual, one would not expect a person 
with very great reasoning powers to form the same belief as a person with 
little reasoning power, even if they are given the same information. 
For example, if I am a dendrologist, having a great deal of knowledge about 
trees, there may be no difficulty in my recognizing that the tree before me 
is an oak. If I know of no reason to question my perceptual apparatus, my 
memory, etc., then it seems that the belief "I see an oak tree" will be proper-
ly basic for me. Of course, not everyone will form this belief, since not 
everyone knows what oak trees look like. Thus the belief is second-level. 
Nevertheless, it seems that if we were all trained dendrologists that we too 
would hold the belief "I see an oak tree" as properly basic, given the ap-
propriate experience. If we had the proper background beliefs and knowl-
edge, then why wouldn't we all be led to the same belief? Similarly, Plan-
tinga might argue that the theist has been given the appropriate information 
and has the right kind of background beliefs etc., which enables her to take 
the belief that God created the flower as properly basic. 
It may be suggested that there is a significant difference between "I see 
an oak tree" and "God created the flower". In the former case all one needs 
is the concept of "oak tree" and one can then identify the tree. Not so with 
the latter. God is not something we can identify by certain features, unlike 
the oak tree. Having a concept of God is not enough to bring about the same 
belief in everyone. Presumably atheists· as well as theists have the concept 
"God" and yet they do not form the religious beliefs. More substantive be-
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liefs are required to bring about a belief about God. The problem, of course, 
is that not everyone has the same background beliefs and correct information; 
the substantive beliefs are lacking. And even if they weren't lacking, would 
having this information be enough to guarantee that everyone would end up 
with the correct belief? While the dendrologist surely has enough information 
to guarantee that he will form the belief (at least if we ask him if he believes 
it is a oak tree he will say yes), it is not at all clear that the theist will form 
the belief, since so much more information is required. 
Putting more meat on the description of the problem will make it more 
clear. Suppose I am walking down the hall and meet a friend - let's call her 
Mary. For me, the following belief is properly basic: I see Mary. Of course 
not everyone will have the information needed to identify this person as 
Mary, some people will be able to do no better, in terms of their beliefs, 
than "I see a person". What is the difference between the oak tree case and 
the Mary case? Just as not everyone has the information needed to identify 
the tree as an oak tree, not everyone has the information needed to identify 
this person as Mary. Is there a significant difference between the kind of 
information needed in the two cases? We identify all oak trees by using the 
same kind of information while only one object meets the description "Ma-
ry". But is the concept "oak tree" different in principle from the concept 
"Mary"? Perhaps, but it seems that the significant similarity in the concepts 
is that they are both what we might call "identificatory" concepts - we have 
agreed, so to speak, to call this an oak tree and this Mary. Once knowing what 
it is that these concepts attach to, we can recognize anything which matches 
the concept as being appropriately called by that term. There is no need for 
some further, more substantive concepts in order to recognize this experience 
as one in which the belief "I see Mary" or "I see an oak tree" is properly 
basic. 
Is the experience of seeing Mary like the experience which warrants the 
belief that God exists? This is a difficult question. At the very least it should 
be noted that Plantinga does not claim that we "see" God. We are inclined 
to believe all sorts of things about God, e.g., God forgives me, God loves me, 
God created this flower, but we do not form beliefs like "I see God." In 
this sense, at least, the experiences or the beliefs formed in them or the rela-
tionship between the experiences and the beliefs, are quite different. So 
what we need is not merely an identificatory concept for God, but a set of 
beliefs and concepts which allows us to recognize the handiwork of God as 
being wrought by God. In this regard it may be instructive to see that we do 
not know that this painting was done by Mary unless someone tells us (per-
haps Mary herself), or we see her paint it, or we are able in some way to 
recognize that this is like the work Mary has painted before. What of the 
work of God? Presumably someone has to tell us, or we must see him do it, 
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or we are able to recognize the work by having see such work before. How-
ever, we have some sort of direct access to Mary - we can identify her -
which enables us to recognize her work as her work and we do not seem to 
have such access to God. Just how would we recognize him, and unless we 
do, how can we ever know that this is his work? But this is precisely what 
is at issue. Can we recognize this experience as one of God and thus iden-
tify the person behind it as God? We come to know Mary, and hence are 
able to recognize her, only if someone, perhaps herself, introduces her to 
us, or at least points her out. Our beliefs about Mary are arrived at in a con-
text, a context in which other information is given to us about Mary. Some 
of this information, in Mary's case, is not propositional, that is, it is sim-
ply visual - call this person "Mary". This enables us to identify and re-
identify Mary. There is no corresponding information about God. We do 
not see, hear, or feel God by our normal perceptual practises. There is no 
one to introduce us to God as we are introduced to another human being. 
How then can we recognize that God created this flower? It is already 
agreed by Plantinga and Grigg, that the experiences which supposedly warrant 
beliefs about God are common experiences which not everyone would iden-
tify as experiences in which beliefs about God are formed. Doesn't one need 
more than mere identificatory concepts in order to move beyond the expe-
rience, that is, in order for beliefs about God to be properly basic? The 
answer seems to be yes, more is needed than merely identificatory concepts, 
since to recognize something as matching the concept seems to require that 
we be able to experience the object and we cannot experience God in the 
requisite way. Does this fact show that beliefs about God cannot be properly 
basic? Only if it can be shown that beliefs about God are unique in this way. 
The question now is whether there are other second-level beliefs which 
have the same characteristics as beliefs about God, viz., have the characteristic 
which demands that there be more than mere identificatory concepts in 
order to recognize this case as a case of X. 
I believe the answer to this question is yes. Suppose that you have just 
been married and one night upon coming home you find your spouse away. 
Several "clues" as to his whereabouts have been left. You discover that his 
car is still in the garage, but his hiking boots are missing. Further, you note 
that the refrigerator is minus his favourite foods. Finally, you uncover a note 
which appears to be in his handwriting stating that he has gone on a day hike 
with some of his friends. You make the inference and form the belief that 
he has gone hiking. In this case all kinds of background beliefs have come 
into play, but you have experienced nothing which enables you to identify 
him or his whereabouts in the direct manner you would have had he been 
at home watching television. In such a case one reasons to the conclusion 
that he has gone hiking and the belief is not basic. 
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Suppose, however, after having been married for some years, you have 
come to know him very well. As you come in the door you notice that his 
hiking boots are missing from the normal spot. You immediately form the 
belief "my husband has gone hiking." This belief depends not on your being 
able to identify your husband, but on a very complex set of substantive 
beliefs about your husband. He acts in thus and so ways, e.g., he only uses 
his hiking boots for hiking. On the grounds Plantinga has laid out, this be-
lief could be properly basic and yet is a second-level belief which does not 
come about merely on the basis of the identificatory concept you have of 
your spouse. Here we have a second-level belief which relies for its proper 
basicality upon some fairly sophisticated background beliefs. While it may 
be that during the first year of one's married life one could only have reached 
the belief by a fairly complicated piece of reasoning, now one simply relies 
upon fairly substantive background beliefs and the appropriate conditions 
and the correct belief is formed. 
Similarly, if we replace Mary's painting in the example above with a 
painting by a famous but deceased artist, let's say Rembrandt, an expert art 
critic might recognize, without discursive reasoning, that this painting is one 
of Rembrandt's. No identificatory concept about Rembrandt himself is being 
used - the art critic has never met or seen Rembrandt, but nevertheless the 
critic is able to form the belief that this picture was done by the artist. The 
concepts one uses to form the belief in question are very substantive, they 
have to do with the form of the painting, the kind of brush strokes, etc., 
but nothing with Rembrandt himself. Of course the expert only became 
an expert after years of study, and in her earlier days she could not have 
made this judgement immediately. Nevertheless, Plantinga could suggest 
that this belief is properly basic for the art critic now. 
That Plantinga has laid out how one could count this as a properly basic 
belief can be seen in the following considerations from his work. First, 
one may first come to believe p on the basis of belief, or perhaps a very 
complicated set of beliefs. For example, I may come to believe that 256 + 
327 = 583 only by calculating it, but later, if I am particularly talented at 
arithmetic, I may just "see" that 256 + 327 = 583. The self-evidence of 
beliefs is person-relative. What is self-evident to the learned is not neces-
sarily self-evident for the unlearned. Second, a belief p may be held as proper-
ly basic by person S at time1 but later Smay learn of some counter-evidence 
for p. The belief ceases to be properly basic for S at time t2. But upon dis-
covering a flaw in the counter-evidence, p will be properly basic for S once 
again. S does not believe p on the basis of the intervening reasoning. That 
reasoning, says Plantinga, is not even part of the basis for p. Even though 
there is a complicated piece of reasoning which is part of the background 
for the proper basicality for p, pis basic or immediate, and not inferred. 
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So on the grounds he has laid out, Plantinga could claim that the belief 
"my husband has gone on a hike" is properly basic for the spouse in the 
conditions suggested above, or that the art critic has a properly basic belief 
in "Rembrandt created this painting". So it is, Plantinga might suggest, with 
beliefs about God. A very complicated set of background beliefs may allow 
you to form a belief such as "God created this flower", while there may not 
be any straight-forward identificatory concept for God. If you know certain 
things about how God would act, or the kind of thing he would make, then 
why wouldn't you be able to identify this flower as one created by God? 
He might go on to suggest, as some of his comments indicate he would, 
that as an unbeliever or an immature believer you may not yet have the 
appropriate information which allows the formation of the belief "God 
created this flower." Nevertheless, as you come to understand more about 
God, you find yourself forming these beliefs quite naturally. Your epistemic 
background, including some very substantive beliefs, becomes essential in 
the formation of these religious beliefs. Indeed, one's entire epistemic struc-
ture may become relevant in this regard. Things one was taught as a child, 
books one has read, movies one has seen, or generally, any experience and 
any belief one has formed may influence the kind of belief formed in a given 
set of conditions. It may be very important that one has learned and under-
stood the concept of God (so far as that is possible) but this is not enough. 
Just as the spouse must know more about her husband than merely under-
standing him on the level of concepts, one must know more about God than 
merely understanding the concept "God." And, as Plantinga points out, it 
may be important that one does not find the problem of evil (or any other 
criticism of theism) to be overwhelming evidence against theism. It may be 
crucial, in some circumstances, that one has been in other conditions in 
which another theistic belief has been taken as properly basic. This is where 
the significance of Plantinga's claims about the circumstance- and condition-
specific nature of rationality come into play. One is rational in one's belief 
only in certain conditions. Those who are not led to the belief about God in 
experience y are not, Plantinga may suggest, in precisely the same conditions 
as those who are. If they were, they would be led to the same belief. One's 
noetic structure and content are very important in understanding the ra-
tionality of beliefs. 
One final note in regard to the experiences. Plantinga could take refuge 
in the suggestion the experience y really does have a different phenome-
nological content; it really is a religious experience and we have been en-
dowed by God with a divine sense in order to gain beliefs about God through 
these experiences. In this case Grigg is correct in claiming that a lack of 
universality of the experience would not count against the proper basicality 
of belief in God. Were this the case, none of Grigg's comments about the 
third disanalogy are relevant. 
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In reply to the three questions asked above, the argument concludes with 
affirmative answers. Can there be a guaranteed second-level belief? Yes. Can a 
second-level belief be properly basic? Yes, given Plantinga's description of 
basic beliefs. Are there second-level beliefs which can serve as the basis for an 
analogical argument for the proper basicality of belief in God? Yes, well at 
least perhaps. If one accepts the view of basicality which Plantinga holds, 
then perhaps we could get a set of beliefs parallel to the original paradigm 
beliefs. But it is not clear that one should accept Plantinga's notion of basic-
ality. But Plantinga may very well insist that his notion is the correct one, 
and on his grounds an argument from analogy for the proper basicality of 
belief in God might be forthcoming. 
N 
It has been argued that beliefs about God suffer from no greater bias in their 
formation than the paradigm properly basic beliefs. Neither does the reli-
gious-belief practise lack confirmation of its reliability, unless perception, 
memory, and the person-belief mechanism do. Finally, although the paradigm 
beliefs are first-level beliefs and beliefs about God are not, there are some be-
liefs which are second-level beliefs but also properly basic, at least on the 
ground laid out by Plantinga. In particular, the examples given had to do with 
people and their handiwork. Perhaps it is difficult to construct parallel exam-
ples of belief generated through perception or memory not having to do with 
people but which rely to the same extent on substantive background beliefs. 
If this is a weakness, and it is not clear that it is, then perhaps the best that 
can be done is to generate an analogical argument about the proper basicality 
of beliefs about God using second-level properly basic beliefs about persons. 
The argument attributed to Plantinga has not, perhaps, escaped unscathed. 
But if one grants the description Plantinga gives of basic beliefs, then none of 
Grigg's disanalogies are, in the final analysis, successful and an analogical 
argument for the proper basicality of beliefs about God can still be advanced. 
There are, however, some issues to raise here. First, it is not at all clear that 
Plantinga's understanding of a properly basic belief is correct, or even plau-
sible. It seems odd that the spouse's belief about her husband's having gone 
hiking is properly basic. It seems clearly to be an inferred belief, or at least a 
belief which derives its warrant from other beliefs, perhaps by some sort of 
coherence. Second, if one has to stretch the notion of a properly basic belief 
as far as the examples discussed above do, then would it not be a more judi-
cious move to reconsider how second level beliefs are justified? Perhaps foun-
dationalism is the wrong kind of theory to use to account for epistemic 
warrant. Exploring a type of coherence theory of justification might be more 
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fruitful, not only for the justification of religious beliefs, but for other com-
monly accepted beliefs as well. There may very well be an analogy between 
religious beliefs and other commonly accepted beliefs, but an analogy which 
is best shown by ceasing to work within the constraints of foundationalism. 5 
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